# 2AC

#### Biopolitics is not bad and the alternative fails. the examples their impact cards have are historically out of context

John Parry (Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law) 2005 “Society Must be Regulated” November, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=854564 ]

That said, I want to close by suggesting that biopolitics, while perhaps not necessarily good, is at least not wholly bad. Absent realistic alternatives, this claim is certainly worth considering. Foucault, for example, never charted a way out of biopolitics beyond developing an individual aesthetic of self-discipline and regulation—the “care of the self.”94 Other writers speak of achieving something like a “new politics,” which usually means some combination of personal freedom that includes the substance—but often not the legal baggage—of individual human rights, combined with an ideal of community that fits uneasily with the ideal of personal freedom (thus the “politics,” which are likely to be anything but new), as well as a more egalitarian economic arrangement and the social safety net of the modern welfare state, but without the modern state itself. Even assuming this vision is desirable, no one has any practical idea how to make it happen.95 My basic assertions are that the ills laid at the feet of biopolitics are not entirely its fault and that they are in any event the costs of “progress.” Consider, first, the charges. Critics point out that in the modern, centralized, biopolitical state, our individuality is suppressed to the larger goal of managing the population. As a result, we become detached and alienated, even as we are disciplined and regulated. At best we can resort to coping strategies, but larger transformation of our social environment is impossible.96 The flaw in this diagnosis is that it treats the alienated individual as problematic, as if there were an acontextual, dehistoricized thing known as “an individual” that is capable of being alienated or not, with the result that we should try to make it less, rather than more, alienated. Far more likely is that the idea of the individual developed in the modern period along with the modern state and that alienation is part of what defines an individual. To the extent the “problem” of the alienated individual has significance in the contemporary world, in other words, it is a direct consequence of the enlightenment and can only be solved through biopolitics. Indeed, biopolitics simply reflects the enlightenment project of promoting reason in place of “superstition” and arbitrary power. Social structures have become rationalized, so that governments are more likely to operate by articulated policy instead of fiat, the rule of law instead of whim, and democracy instead of hereditary rule or warlordism. The creation of the individual—a rational, rights-bearing but also alienated entity—is critical to all of these developments. Importantly, under this account, these changes may not be liberating in any objective sense, because the freedoms they create come with real costs—the costs of being free in this way as well as the consequences of being part of a power structure in which these particular freedoms are defined, managed, and subject to suspension. Still, this process leads not only to centralization and state violence but also to rights that channel the exercise of state power, to pervasive regulation of our lives and environment but also to a significant amount of predictability and security for many people. Our modern anxiety can be imperfectly assuaged by the comforts that flow from management and technology, and there is no reason to believe we are any less happy than people were in the past—although neither is it clear that we are any happier. How the costs and benefits of the enlightenment and biopolitics shake out, and whether that should even be the way we assess them (it appears to be a loaded standard, after all), are political and moral issues. Even more, however, they are questions of aesthetics. The comforts and controls of biopolitics will appeal to many people. Others will find fulfillment in acts of resistance along a variety of fronts. Beyond that, and what the future will bring, who can say?

#### No Impact - Biopolitics does not cause huge global massacres

Mika Ojakangas (PhD in Social Science and Academy research fellow @ the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies @ University of Helsinki) 2005 “The Impossible Dialogue on Biopower: Foucault and Agamben,” May 2005, Foucault Studies, No. 2, http://www.foucault-studies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf

Admittedly, in the era of biopolitics, as Foucault writes, even “massacres have become vital.” This is not the case, however, because violence is hidden in the foundation of biopolitics, as Agamben believes. Although the twentieth century thanatopolitics is the “reverse of biopolitics”, it should not be understood, according to Foucault, as “the effect, the result, or the logical consequence” of biopolitical rationality. Rather, it should be understood, as he suggests, as an outcome of the “demonic combination” of the sovereign power and biopower, of “the citycitizen game and the shepherd-flock game” or as I would like to put it, of patria potestas (father’s unconditional power of life and death over his son) and cura maternal (mother’s unconditional duty to take care of her children). Although massacres can be carried out in the name of care, they do not follow from the logic of biopower for which death is the “object of taboo”. They follow from the logic of sovereign power, which legitimates killing by whatever arguments it chooses, be it God, Nature, or life.

#### Biopolitics is key to Modern Science and Medicine

Nikolas Rose (Professor of Sociology at Goldsmiths College – University of London) 2001 “The Politics of Life Itself” Theory, Culture & Society Vol. 18(6): 1–30

THE BIOLOGICAL existence of human beings has become political in novel ways. The object, target and stake of this new ‘vital’ politics are human life itself. How might we analyse it?1 I would like to start from a well known remark by Michel Foucault, in the first volume of The History of Sexuality: ‘For millennia man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living being with the additional capacity for political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being into question’ (Foucault, 1979: 188). Foucault’s thesis, as is well known, was that, in Western societies at least, we lived in a ‘biopolitical’ age. Since the 18th century, political power has no longer been exercised through the stark choice of allowing life or giving death. Political authorities, in alliance with many others, have taken on the task of the management of life in the name of the well-being of the population as a vital order and of each of its living subjects. Politics now addresses the vital processes of human existence: the size and quality of the population; reproduction and human sexuality; conjugal, parental and familial relations; health and disease; birth and death. Biopolitics was inextricably bound up with the rise of the life sciences, the human sciences, clinical medicine. It has given birth to techniques, technologies, experts and apparatuses for the care and administration of the life of each and all, from town planning to health services. And it has given a kind of ‘vitalist’ character to the existence of individuals as political subjects.

#### That’s key to human survival and solves the impact to the K

Edwin A Locke (Professor of Management – University of Maryland-College Park and Senior Writer – Ayn Rand Institute) 1997 “The Greatness of Western Civilization” www.aynrand.org/site/News2?JServSessionIdr001=7xcem0b1i1.app7a&page=NewsArticle&id=6164&news\_iv\_ctrl=1077

The triumph of reason and rights made possible the full development and application of science and technology and ultimately modern industrial society. Reason and rights freed man's mind from the tyranny of religious dogma and freed man's productive capacity from the tyranny of state control. Scientific and technological progress followed in several interdependent steps. Men began to understand the laws of nature. They invented an endless succession of new products. And they engaged in large-scale production, that is, the creation of wealth, which in turn financed and motivated further invention and production. As a result, horse-and-buggies were replaced by automobiles, wagon tracks by steel rails, candles by electricity. At last, after millennia of struggle, man became the master of his environment. The result of the core achievements of Western civilization has been an increase in freedom, wealth, health, comfort, and life expectancy unprecedented in the history of the world. The achievements were greatest in the country where the principles of reason and rights were implemented most consistently--the United States of America. In contrast, it was precisely in those Eastern and African countries which did not embrace reason, rights, and technology where people suffered (and still suffer) most from both natural and man-made disasters (famine, poverty, illness, dictatorship) and where life-expectancy was (and is) lowest. It is said that primitives live "in harmony with nature," but in reality they are simply victims of the vicissitudes of nature--if some dictator does not kill them first. The greatness of the West is not an "ethnocentric" prejudice; it is an objective fact. This assessment is based on the only proper standard for judging a government or a society: the degree to which its core values are pro- or anti-life. Pro-life cultures acknowledge and respect man's nature as a rational being who must discover and create the conditions which his survival and happiness require--which means that they advocate reason, rights, freedom, and technological progress. Despite its undeniable triumphs, Western civilization is by no means secure. Its core principles are under attack from every direction--by religious fanatics, by dictators and, most disgracefully, by Western intellectuals, who are denouncing reason in the name of skepticism, rights in the name of special entitlements, and progress in the name of environmentalism. We are heading rapidly toward the dead end of nihilism. The core values and achievements of the West and America must be asserted proudly and defended to the death. Our lives depend on them.

### 2AC Ontology

#### Ontology first is logically bankrupt

Jackson 2010 (Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Associate Professor of International Relations in the School of International Service at the American University in Washington, DC, 2010, “The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics,” ebook)

However, I do not think that putting ontology first is the panacea that many seem to think it is. For one thing, if one puts ontology first then one is, at least provisionally, committed to a particular (if revisable) account of what the world is made up of: co-constituted agents and structures, states interacting under conditions of anarchy, global class relations, or what have you. This is a rather large leap to make on anyone’s authority, let alone that of a philosopher of science. Along these lines, it is unclear what if any warrant we could provide for most ontological claims if ontology in this sense were to always “come first.” If someone makes an ontological claim about something existing in the world, then we are faced with an intriguing epistemological problem of how possibly to know whether that claim is true, and the equally intriguing problem of selecting the proper methods to use in evaluating the claim (Chernoff 2009b, 391). But if epistemology and method are supposed to be fitted to ontology, then we are stuck with techniques and standards designed to respond to the specificity of the object under investigation. This problem is roughly akin to using state-centric measurements of cross-border transactions to determine whether globalization is eroding state borders, because the very object under investigation—“state borders”—is presupposed by the procedures of data-collection, meaning that the answer will always, and necessarily, assert the persistence of the state.

#### Ontology focus at the expense of action causes paralysis

McClean 2001 David McClean (philosopher, writer and business consultant, conducted graduate work in philosophy at NYU) 2001 “The cultural left and the limits of social hope” http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm

There is a lot of philosophical prose on the general subject of social justice. Some of this is quite good, and some of it is quite bad. What distinguishes the good from the bad is not merely the level of erudition. Displays of high erudition are gratuitously reflected in much of the writing by those, for example, still clinging to Marxian ontology and is often just a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near total disconnect from empirical reality. This kind of political writing likes to make a lot of references to other obscure, jargon-laden essays and tedious books written by other true believers - the crowd that takes the fusion of Marxian and Freudian private fantasies seriously. Nor is it the lack of scholarship that makes this prose bad. Much of it is well "supported" by footnotes referencing a lode of other works, some of which are actually quite good. Rather, what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to extant and critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws, and the amendment of existing regulations that might actually do some good for someone else. The writers of this bad prose are too interested in our arrival at some social place wherein we will finally emerge from our "inauthentic" state into something called "reality." Most of this stuff, of course, comes from those steeped in the Continental tradition (particularly post-Kant). While that tradition has much to offer and has helped shape my own philosophical sensibilities, it is anything but useful when it comes to truly relevant philosophical analysis, and no self-respecting Pragmatist can really take seriously the strong poetry of formations like "authenticity looming on the ever remote horizons of fetishization." What Pragmatists see instead is the hope that we can fix some of the social ills that face us if we treat policy and reform as more important than Spirit and Utopia.

#### Violence is decreasing due to hegemony- DA to the alt

Drezner 2005 Daniel W. Drezner Associate Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University May 25, 2005 “Gregg Easterbrook, war, and the dangers of extrapolation” http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002087.html

The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991. Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the extent and intensity of global combat is now less than half what it was 15 years ago. Easterbrook spends the rest of the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars. That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out. First, he neglects to mention the biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a global hegemon called the United States right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand why it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: the reason the "great powers" get along is that the United States is much, much more powerful than anyone else. If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes. [If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago: We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind – and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. But a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world. The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away. Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and the spread of democracy are right out the window.

## Imperialism Good

Worse powers fill the gap- turns the k

Shaw, 2002 (Martin Shaw, professor of international relations at University of Sussex, Uses and Abuses of Anti-Imperialism in the Global Era, 4-7-2002, http://www.martinshaw.org/empire.htm)

It is fashionable in some circles, among which we must clearly include the organizers of this conference, to argue that the global era is seeing 'a new imperialism' - that can be blamed for the problem of 'failed states' (probably among many others). Different contributors to this strand of thought name this imperialism in different ways, but novelty is clearly a critical issue. The logic of using the term imperialism is actually to establish continuity between contemporary forms of Western world power and older forms first so named by Marxist and other theorists a century ago. The last thing that critics of a new imperialism wish to allow is that Western power has changed sufficiently to invalidate the very application of this critical concept. Nor have many considered the possibility that if the concept of imperialism has a relevance today, it applies to certain aggressive, authoritarian regimes of the non-Western world rather than to the contemporary West.  In this paper I fully accept that there is a concentration of much world power - economic, cultural, political and military - in the hands of Western elites. In my recent book, Theory of the Global State, I discuss the development of a 'global-Western state conglomerate' (Shaw 2000). I argue that 'global' ideas and institutions, whose significance characterizes the new political era that has opened with the end of the Cold War, depend largely - but not solely - on Western power. I hold no brief and intend no apology for official Western ideas and behaviour. And yet I propose that the idea of a new imperialism is a profoundly misleading, indeed ideological concept that obscures the realities of power and especially of empire in the twenty-first century. This notion is an obstacle to understanding the significance, extent and limits of contemporary Western power. It simultaneously serves to obscure many real causes of oppression, suffering and struggle for transformation against the quasi-imperial power of many regional states. I argue that in the global era, this separation has finally become critical. This is for two related reasons. On the one hand, Western power has moved into new territory, largely uncharted -- and I argue unchartable -- with the critical tools of anti-imperialism. On the other hand, the politics of empire remain all too real, in classic forms that recall both modern imperialism and earlier empires, in many non-Western states, and they are revived in many political struggles today. Thus the concept of a 'new imperialism' fails to deal with both key post-imperial features of Western power and the quasi-imperial character of many non-Western states. The concept overstates Western power and understates the dangers posed by other, more authoritarian and imperial centres of power. Politically it identifies the West as the principal enemy of the world's people, when for many of them there are far more real and dangerous enemies closer to home. I shall return to these political issues at the end of this paper.

### 2AC Impact D- Otherization

#### Not the root cause of conflict – other factors overwhelm

Volf 2002 Miroslav Volf (Henry B. Wright Professor of Theology at Yale Divinity School since 1998) Journal of Ecumenical Studies 1-1-02

Though “otherness”–cultural, ethnic, religious, racial difference–is an important factor in our relations with others, we should not overestimate it as a cause of conflict. During the war in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990′s, I was often asked, “What is this war about? Is it about religious and cultural differences? Is it about economic advantage? Is it about political power? Is it about land?” The correct response was, of course, that the war was about all of these things. Monocausal explanations of major eruptions of violence are rarely right. Moreover, various causes are intimately intertwined, and each contributes to others. That holds true also for otherness, which I am highlighting here. However, neither should we underestimate otherness as a factor. The contest for political power, for economic advantage, and for a share of the land took place between people who belonged to discrete cultural and ethnic groups. Part of the goal of the war in the former Yugoslavia was the creation of ethnically clean territories with economic and political autonomy. The importance of “otherness” is only slightly diminished if we grant that the sense of ethnic and religious belonging was manipulated by unscrupulous, corrupt, and greedy politicians for their own political and economic gain. The fact that conjured fears for one’s identity could serve to legitimize a war whose major driving force lay elsewhere is itself a testimony to how much “otherness” matters.

#### Extinction outweighs – as long as there is some life there’s only a risk they retain ontological capacity

Jonas 1996 Hans Jonas (Former Alvin Johnson Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research and Former Eric Voegelin Visiting Prof. – U. Munich) 1996 “Morality and Mortality: A Search for the Good After Auschwitz”, p. 111-112)

With this look ahead at an ethics for the future, we are touching at the same time upon the question of the future of freedom. The unavoidable discussion of this question seems to give rise to misunderstandings. My dire prognosis that not only our material standard of living but also our democratic freedoms would fall victim to the growing pressure of a worldwide ecological crisis, until finally there would remain only some form of tyranny that would try to save the situation, has led to the accusation that I am defending dictatorship as a solution to our problems. I shall ignore here what is a confusion between warning and recommendation. But I have indeed said that such a tyranny would still be better than total ruin; thus, I have ethically accepted it as an alternative. I must now defend this standpoint, which I continue to support, before the court that I myself have created with the main argument of this essay. For are we not contradicting ourselves in prizing physical survival at the price of freedom? Did we not say that freedom was the condition of our capacity for responsibility—and that this capacity was a reason for the survival of humankind?; By tolerating tyranny as an alternative to physical annihilation are we not violating the principle we established: that the How of existence must not take precedence over its Why? Yet we can make a terrible concession to the primacy of physical survival in the conviction that the ontological capacity for freedom, inseparable as it is from man's being, cannot really be extinguished, only temporarily banished from the public realm. This conviction can be supported by experience we are all familiar with. We have seen that even in the most totalitarian societies the urge for freedom on the part of some individuals cannot be extinguished, and this renews our faith in human beings. Given this faith, we have reason to hope that, as long as there are human beings who survive, the image of God will continue to exist along with them and will wait in concealment for its new hour. With that hope—which in this particular case takes precedence over fear—it is permissible, for the sake of physical survival, to accept if need be a temporary absence of freedom in the external affairs of humanity. This is, I want to emphasize, a worst-case scenario, and it is the foremost task of responsibility at this particular moment in world history to prevent it from happening. This is in fact one of the noblest of duties (and at the same time one concerning self-preservation), on the part of the imperative of responsibility to avert future coercion that would lead to lack of freedom by acting freely in the present, thus preserving as much as possible the ability of future generations to assume responsibility. But more than that is involved. At stake is the preservation of Earth's entire miracle of creation, of which our human existence is a part and before which man reverently bows, even without philosophical "grounding." Here too faith may precede and reason follow; it is faith that longs for this preservation of the Earth (fides quaerens intellectum), and reason comes as best it can to faith's aid with arguments, not knowing or even asking how much depends on its success or failure in determining what action to take. With this confession of faith we come to the end of our essay on ontology.

#### Existence is a prerequisite to ontological questioning

Wapner 2003 Paul Wapner (associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University) Winter 2003 “Leftist criticism of” http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=539

THE THIRD response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of "nature" does deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, but how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.

#### No root cause of war – decades of research votes aff

Cashman 2000 Greg Cashman (Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University) 2000 “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9

Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.

#### Performative Contradiction: they claim to know the case is false, replicating the form of mastery Spanos critiques

Marzec 01**An Anatomy of Empire Robert P. Marzec symploke 9.1-2 (2001) 165-168 State University of New York--Fredonia Robert P. Marzec teaches postcolonial studies and contemporary criticism at the State University of New York at Fredonia. He is working on forthcoming book-length project entitled Land and Empire.**

**This reconfiguration of critical thought enables Spanos to "unconceal" the ontological force of American contemporary imperialism, and to resituate the war in Vietnam as an event that reveals the violent metaphysical imperative of "mastering" informing the idea of America**. In constructing his counter-memory archive, **Spanos finds the origins of this impulse to master reality in the Roman transformation of Greek thinking.** The early Greek thinking of being as temporal and groundless (notable in philosophers such as Parmenides and Anaxemander) undergoes a hardening process that results in the colonization of lived events for purposes of intellectual manipulation: the Greek logos as legein (words) is transformed into Logos as Ratio (the Word of Reason); **the agonistic Greek [End Page 166] understanding of truth as a-letheia is annulled in favor of the Roman circumscription of truth as correctness (veritas).** More than a challenge to accepted periodizations of imperialism, **Spanos's compelling insight here shows how colonization begins at the site of thought itself, that it has been a way of thinking holding dominion for far longer than commonly consi-dered. Thinking, he reveals, has come to be governed by an impulse to reify being as a thoroughly controlled spatial image, "a 'field' or 'region' or 'domain' to be comprehended, mastered, and exploited**" (191). This change naturalizes and universalizes an instrumentalism that transforms the "uncalculability of being" into a utility, into a "world picture" that can be grasped in a technological age that conceals the nothing at the heart of the social order for purposes of reducing being to a disposable commodity. Consequently, the instability and the antagonism offered by the heterogeneity disseminated by the movement of temporality is re-presented as a problem to be surmounted and eventually "solved" with the imposition of "a final and determinate solution" (191).

# 1AR

#### Perm: Do Both. Use the affirmative to maintain critical distance – this gets the fullest solvency potential while avoiding 4 disads that would undermine K solvency: category blurring, Schmittian mis-weaving, example/paradigm isomorphism, and sovereignty beyond rule/regulation.

Norris 03

<http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/default.asp?channel_id=2188&editorial_id=13097> The exemplary exception - Philosophical and political decisions in Giorgio Agamben's Homo Sacer Andrew Norris

Of all the beings that are, presumably the most difficult to think about are living creatures, because on the one hand they are in a certain way most closely akin to us, and on the other are at the same time separated from our ek-sistent essence by an abyss. Martin Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism' In Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life Giorgio Agamben draws upon metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, set theory and the philosophy of language to advance a number of radical politico-philosophical claims. In contrast to arguments that understand political community as essentially a common 'belonging' in a shared national, ethnic, religious, or moral identity, Agamben argues that 'the original political relation is the ban' in which a mode of life is actively and continuously excluded or shut out (ex-claudere) from the polis. The decision as to what constitutes the life that is thereby taken outside of the polis is a sovereign decision. Sovereignty is therefore not a historically specific form of political authority that arises with modern nation-states and their conceptualization by Hobbes and Bodin, but rather the essence of the political. Similarly, biopolitics is not, as Foucault sometimes suggests, incompatible with sovereign as opposed to disciplinary power; nor is it a distinctively modern phenomenon. Instead it is the original form of politics: 'the fundamental activity of sovereign power is the production of bare life as originary political element and as threshold of articulation between nature and culture, zoe and bios.' Attending to the etymology of the word 'decide' one can understand this sovereign decision as a cut in life, one that separates real life from merely existent life, political and human life from the life of the non-human. As this cutting defines the political, the production of the inhuman - which is correlative with the production of the human - is not an activity that politics might dispense with, say in favour of the assertion of human rights. More specifically, the Nazi death camps are not a political aberration, least of all a unique event, but instead the place where politics as the sovereign decision on life most clearly reveals itself: 'today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West.'1 The Lager is a threshold in which human beings are reduced to bare life; and the torture this life suffers is nothing else but its exclusion from the polis as a distinctively human life. The bare life that is produced by this abandonment by the state is not biological life; 'not simple natural life, but life exposed to death (bare life or sacred life) is the originary political element'.2 This is the Muselmann as described by Primo Levi in If This is a Man. One speaks of the Shoah as industrialized mass death, and of the camps as 'factories of death'. But the product of these factories is not death but, as Arendt puts it, a mode of life 'outside of life and death'.3 If for Arendt, however, the production of MuselmŠnner is anti-political, in that the camps are spaces in which plurality is foreclosed, for Agamben it is the emergence of the essence of the political. Such claims are difficult for political philosophy to address, as they undermine so many of its guiding assumptions. Instead of asking us to construct and evaluate different plans of action, Agamben asks us to evaluate the metaphysical structure and implications of the activity of politics as such. Instead of asking us to consider the true or proper nature of political identity, Agamben asks us to consider a threshold state of the non-identical, the liminal. And far from bringing concepts such as rights, authority, public interest, liberty or equality more clearly into view, Agamben operates at a level of abstraction at which such concepts blur into their opposites. He takes this approach because, like Arendt, he believes that claims to justice can only be made if one understands the ground of the political upon which both justice and injustice stand. If Foucault's goal was 'to make the cultural unconscious apparent',4 Agamben's is that of bringing to expression the metaphysics that our history has thus far only shown. He argues that, properly understood, what that history shows us is that politics is the truly fundamental structure of Western metaphysics insofar as it occupies the threshold on which the relation between the living being and the logos is realized. In the 'politicization' of bare life - the metaphysical task par excellence - the humanity of living man is decided [si decide].É There is politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion.5 What is perhaps both most intriguing and most problematic about Agamben's work is that - unlike, say, that of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy - it brings these claims about metaphysics into dialogue with a specific set of quite concrete examples, including refugee camps, hospital wards, death rows and military camps. All of these are sites where, on Agamben's account, one can perceive the metaphysical negation that allows for the affirmation of distinctively human life: bare life, nuda vita. One way to evaluate Agamben's claims is to consider how well they help us to describe and understand such examples.6 Another is to ask whether Agamben's claims are intelligible on their own account - to see, that is, whether they open themselves up to an immanent critique. This approach has a number of advantages, chief among which is that it does not demand that we simply choose whether to accept or reject Agamben's approach in a global way. Instead such an approach allows us to be open to a radically different way of thinking about politics and political philosophy while at the same time maintaining some critical distance from it. In what follows I want to pursue this option by way of considering Agamben's appropriation of the early decisionist political theory of Carl Schmitt. I will argue that Agamben's acceptance of Schmitt's central claims regarding political judgment make it impossible for him to weave together his suggestive reading of examples from philosophy and political history into a mode of political thought that fulfils his own ambition of 'returning thought to its practical calling'.7 Agamben's project hinges upon the paradigmatic status of the camp. But on his own account, there is an isomorphism between the exception and the example or paradigm. Given his acceptance of Schmitt's analysis of the former as the product of the sovereign decision, this makes Agamben's evaluation of the camp as 'the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West' into a sovereign decision beyond the regulation of rule or reason. As this casts his readers as either subject or enemy, it is hard to imagine how the politics it might produce will serve as a real alternative to that which it contests.

#### Perm: Do both to endorse the remnants. This works like a juxtaposition perm. If they win links and thus prove the affirmative and the alternative are “mutually exclusive” - it just proves there is a caesura between the affirmative and the alternative – this remnant provides the ONLY means of redemption. Without the affirmative – if you vote negative to endorse only the alternative instead of both, there’s no caesura – no division between – and thus no place to begin redemption.

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http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol2no1\_2003/mills\_agamben.html Borderlands e-journal ethics of bare life Arrow vol 2 no 1 contents About borderlands Volume 2 Number 1, 2003 REVIEW ESSAY An Ethics of Bare Life: Agamben on Witnessing Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, Zone Books: New York, 1999. Catherine Mills Australian National University

4. One of the central though equivocal concepts within Agamben's account of an ethics of witnessing is that of the remnant*,* indicated in the title. Toward the end of the book, Agamben notes that the notion of remnant does not simply indicate the part of a whole remaindered through a process of selection and segregation but instead indicates the troubled caesuras and points of contact between the part and the whole. Agamben claims that the remnant is a theologico-messianic concept, which designates the consistency of a people in relation to salvation or the messianic event. Marking the division or non-coincidence between the whole and the part, the remnant appears as the 'redemptive machine' that permits the salvation of the whole from which it emerges as the signification of division and loss (Agamben, 1999: 162). The remnants mark the division between the whole and part and provide the only means of redemption. Thus in relation to Auschwitz, the remnants of Auschwitz are neither those who died in the gas chambers nor those who survived the camps, neither the drowned nor the saved, but rather, that which remains between them. And insofar as testimony marks the non-coincidental intimacy of the human and inhuman, that is, the human being's remaining human in enduring the inhuman, testimony appears as the task of the remnant of biopolitics.
5. Agamben begins his reflections on the aporia of witnessing the event of Auschwitz by noting two terms for witness in Latin: the first of these is *testis,* which indicates the position of a third party in a trial or lawsuit between rival parties. The second is *superstes,* a term that designates a person who has lived through something, 'who has experienced an event from beginning to end and can therefore bear witness to it', that is, one who has survived an event and can thus speak of it from the position of having undergone it. (Agamben, 1999: 17)
6. It is in the second of these definitions of witnessing that Agamben is most interested, as it is on the basis of this definition of witnessing that Auschwitz presents a particular problem for an account of testimony. The paradox of bearing witness to Auschwitz is presented in Levi's observation that We, the survivors are not the true witnesses…we survivors are not only an exiguous but also anomalous minority. We…did not touch bottom. Those who did so, who saw the Gorgon, have not returned to tell about it or have returned mute, but they are the 'Muslims', the submerged, the complete witnesses…(Levi, 1988: 63-63; Agamben, 1999: 33). Agamben's question then is: if the complete and true witnesses of Auschwitz are not the survivors but rather the drowned and desolate, those who have not returned at all or who have returned mute, then how is it possible that the event of Auschwitz be borne witness to? What are the ethical implications of this paradox?

#### Policy gaming is a key pedagogical practice for understanding and criticising how complex systems like the state function

Sands and Shelton 2010 (Eric C. Sands, assistant professor of government and international studies at Berry College, and Allison M. Shelton, graduate student in political science and international affairs at the University of Georgia's School of Public and International Affairs, January 2010, “Learning by Doing: A Simulation for Teaching How Congress Works,” PS: Political Science & Politics, Vol 43, Issue 1, Cambridge Journals)

The use of simulations first became popular in the education community in the 1960s as educational psychologists recognized the innate ability of student-centered activities to enhance both the cognitive and affective (relating to value judgments) absorption of knowledge (Boocok and Schild 1968; Dewey 1966; Holt 1967; Smith and Smith 1966.) Over the next 40 years, this recognition evolved into a general acceptance of interactive activities as more effective teaching methodologies than standard didactic instruction (Bandura 1977; Greenblat 1973; Greenblat and Duke 1975; Heitzmann 1974; Kolb 1984; Maxson 1974).¶ Scholars grounded this acceptance in an understanding that it was through the active engagement, processing, and constructing of material that students learned, not through the mere passive reception of information typical of a lecture hall (Bolles 1988; Klionsky 2001). This conceptualization of learning extended even beyond the study of education pedagogy, as it was adopted by brain research specialists who began studying “whole brain learning,” or the concept of teaching to the multiple intelligences of the brain (Gorovitz 1982).¶ As a result of this extensive scholarship, the use of simulations has become an established practice in classrooms pursuing higher-order cognitive and affective objectives. In fact, the effectiveness of simulations has been so widely established that they have been adopted in academic, business, and military settings around the world (Assa 1982; Crookall 1995; Rohn 1986).¶ To be sure, political scientists have not ignored the value that simulations play in teaching students about politics. It has long been recognized (Walcott 1980; Dodge 1983) that simulations are a valuable tool in helping students to understand the complex dynamics of institutions and political systems, and this lesson has been applied to many areas of the discipline, including comparative politics (Shellman 2001; Galatas 2006; Kaarbo and Lantis 1997), international relations (Jefferson 1999; Winham 1991; Dougherty 2003), and American politics (Hensley 1993; Thomas 2002; Endersby and Webber 1995; Ciliotta-Rubery and Levy 2000). In short, it has become increasingly accepted by teachers of political science that simulations “have the power to recreate complex, dynamic political processes in the classroom, allowing students to examine the motivations, behavioral constraints, resources and interactions among institutional actors … after a simulation, participants have a deeper understanding of institutions, their successes and failures” (Smith and Boyer 1996, 690).

#### Performative Contradiction: they claim to know the case is false, replicating the form of mastery Spanos critiques

Marzec 01**An Anatomy of Empire Robert P. Marzec symploke 9.1-2 (2001) 165-168 State University of New York--Fredonia Robert P. Marzec teaches postcolonial studies and contemporary criticism at the State University of New York at Fredonia. He is working on forthcoming book-length project entitled Land and Empire.**

**This reconfiguration of critical thought enables Spanos to "unconceal" the ontological force of American contemporary imperialism, and to resituate the war in Vietnam as an event that reveals the violent metaphysical imperative of "mastering" informing the idea of America**. In constructing his counter-memory archive, **Spanos finds the origins of this impulse to master reality in the Roman transformation of Greek thinking.** The early Greek thinking of being as temporal and groundless (notable in philosophers such as Parmenides and Anaxemander) undergoes a hardening process that results in the colonization of lived events for purposes of intellectual manipulation: the Greek logos as legein (words) is transformed into Logos as Ratio (the Word of Reason); **the agonistic Greek [End Page 166] understanding of truth as a-letheia is annulled in favor of the Roman circumscription of truth as correctness (veritas).** More than a challenge to accepted periodizations of imperialism, **Spanos's compelling insight here shows how colonization begins at the site of thought itself, that it has been a way of thinking holding dominion for far longer than commonly consi-dered. Thinking, he reveals, has come to be governed by an impulse to reify being as a thoroughly controlled spatial image, "a 'field' or 'region' or 'domain' to be comprehended, mastered, and exploited**" (191). This change naturalizes and universalizes an instrumentalism that transforms the "uncalculability of being" into a utility, into a "world picture" that can be grasped in a technological age that conceals the nothing at the heart of the social order for purposes of reducing being to a disposable commodity. Consequently, the instability and the antagonism offered by the heterogeneity disseminated by the movement of temporality is re-presented as a problem to be surmounted and eventually "solved" with the imposition of "a final and determinate solution" (191).

#### Their splitting of ontological questioning and policy analysis replicates the error of ontological ostracism, blocking alternative solvency

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**The power of this triumph of instrumentalist thinking lies in its ability to throw all foundational inquiry into oblivion**. In its ubiquity, **this instrumentality affects the very people attempting to offer opposition to the dominant order, for within the problematic of contemporary criticism, one is either characterized as engaging in a form of "high theory" that uses a language that fails to speak to the world at large, or one resists by taking "real political action." Thus, ontological analyses are doubly ostracized. This constitutes an incredible handicap to oppositional thinking in the post-Cold War era. Spanos writes:**

 [F]or an **opposition that limits resistance to the political, means a time of defeat**. But for the oppositional thinker who is attuned to the ontological exile to which he/she has been condemned by the global triumph of technological thinking it also means the recognition that this exilic condition of silence constitutes an irresolvable contradiction in the "Truth" of instrumental thinking --the "shadow" that haunts its light--that demands to be thought. In the interregnum, the primary task of the margin-alized intellectual is the re-thinking of thinking itself . . . [I]t is the event of the Vietnam War--and the dominant American culture's inordinate will to forget it--that provides the directives for this most difficult of tasks not impossible. (193)